Green Innovation and the Value of Multinationality by Kim, Incheol et al.
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
ScholarWorks @ UTRGV 
Economics and Finance Faculty Publications 
and Presentations 
Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship 
3-15-2020 
Green Innovation and the Value of Multinationality 
Incheol Kim 
The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
Christos Pantzalis 
Zhengyi Zhang 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/ef_fac 
 Part of the Finance Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kim, Incheol and Pantzalis, Christos and Zhang, Zhengyi, Green Innovation and the Value of 
Multinationality (March 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562104 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3562104 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship at ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics and Finance Faculty 
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information, 
please contact justin.white@utrgv.edu, william.flores01@utrgv.edu. 
Green Innovation and the Value of Multinationality 
 
Incheol Kim,* Christos Pantzalis,** and Zhengyi Zhang*** 
3/15/2020 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
When do multinational corporations (MNCs) derive the most from internalizing the transfer of 
proprietary technological knowhow? We revisit this question, which lies at the core of theories on 
multinationality and performance, from the perspective of corporate strategy involving the mix of 
green versus non-green innovation effort and a foreign operations focus on countries with high-
versus-low environmental standards. We find that high exposure to foreign markets with more 
stringent environmental regulations stimulates MNCs’ green patent applications. We further show that 
MNCs’ environmental competitive advantage obtained through green innovation activities, coupled 
with exposure to foreign countries with high environmental standards, increases firm value in the long 
run. However, this long-run advantage produces economic rents only when foreign countries have a 
common-law legal system, effective government, and high growth. Finally, the pursuit of green (or 
even non-green) innovation while competing in polluting industries is positively associated with 
market value. Overall, our study highlights that green technology development is a main source of 
value creation for multinationals.  
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1. Introduction 
The theory of international business (e.g., see Caves, 1974; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 
1982; and among many others) posits that multinational corporations (MNCs) possess proprietary 
knowhow and expertise that offer a competitive advantage over local corporations in foreign markets. 
By internally deploying firm-specific intangible assets into their foreign market’s operations, MNCs 
can increase efficiency, avoid costs of external contracting, and therefore accrue economic rents. 
Although empirical tests of this conceptually appealing theory have provided a broad range of 
findings,1 the consensus supports the notion that multinationality enhances the value-relevance of 
intangibles but also has its own intrinsic value separate from intangibles.2 This paper explores the 
source of value creation in corporate multinationality from a perspective of corporate strategy 
involving the mix of foreign market focus and green technology development. This empirical 
investigation acknowledges the importance of national institutions to support innovative activity in a 
world where such activity has itself become largely internationalized (Carlsson, 2006) and intents to 
shed light on the value implications of location choice (Siedschlag et al., 2013) for green technological 
development. 
                                                          
1 For instance, Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) show that firms with geographical diversified segments underperform 
relative to firms with a single-nation segment. A possible driver of the negative relation between geographical 
diversification and firm value is that the multinationality is also associated with higher monitoring costs and more severe 
agency problems as reflected in differences in MNC and domestic firms’ capital structure. Errunza and Senbet (1981) is 
an early study that established a positive link between corporate internationalization (i.e., multinationality) and firm value. 
Kim, Hwang, and Burgers (1989) find a positive relation between global diversification and profitability, especially when 
diversification takes place across unrelated industries. Morck and Yeung (1991) show that the interaction of 
multinationality and R&D spending is positively associated with firm value, implying that intangible assets that MNCs 
possess are a source of value creation.  
2 Kirca et al. (2011) use a meta-analysis of 120 independent samples reported in 111 studies to confirm the predictions of 
internalization theory in the context of the multinationality-performance relationship. Their findings indicate that 
multinationality provides an efficient organizational form that enables firms to transfer their firm-specific assets across 
borders to generate higher returns in international markets. Furthermore, their evidence also suggests that multinationality 
has intrinsic value above and beyond the intangible assets that firms possess.   
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We first investigate whether MNCs adjust their green technology development based on their 
degree of exposure to foreign markets with more (less) stringent environmental regulations. Over the 
years, costs of compliance with new environmental regulations have rapidly risen as global 
environmental standards have become increasingly stringent. Accordingly, MNCs are forced to 
choose their best environmental strategies to cope with rising international environmental pressure 
(see Dechezleprêtre, Neumayer, and Perkins, 2015; Letchumanan and Kodama, 2000). Our empirical 
method accounts for the degree of environmental pressure, by differentiating between the percentage 
of foreign sales in countries whose environmental regulations are more stringent (ForesaleHIGH) and in 
countries where environmental pressure is low (ForesaleLOW). We quantify corporate environmental 
strategy in terms of efforts to develop green innovation using counts of patent applications associated 
with environmental protection. We find that the percentage of foreign sales in countries with stronger 
(weaker) environmental regulations than those of the MNC’s home country is positively (negatively) 
associated with MNC green patent applications. This finding supports the notion that MNCs’ 
exposure to markets with more environmental pressure can drive green innovation effort and is 
broadly consistent with Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) who show that European firms increase the 
number of patent applications related to low-carbon technology by 36% compared with non-
European matched peers after the initiation of the 2005 European Union Emissions Trading System 
(EU ETS). 
We next test whether MNCs’ environmental competitive advantage (obtained through patent 
stocks related to environmental protection) becomes capitalized, resulting in higher market value, and 
under what conditions.3 Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that one of the bright 
                                                          
3 A voluminous amount of research shows that corporate research and development intensity or innovation is positively 
associated with earnings and stock returns (e.g., Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001; Sood and Tellis, 2009). In 
addition, a large number of studies provide evidence that multinationality enhances the value relevance of intangibles 
[e.g., Morck and Yeung (1991), Allen and Pantzalis (1996), and Pantzalis (2001)]. 
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sides of having more stringent domestic environmental regulations is motivating firms to be more 
innovative. Products and services based on green innovation may thus potentially create a competitive 
advantage for MNCs over peers not equipped with ecofriendly mindsets in new foreign markets. We 
report a positive, long-term value impact of green innovation measured by environmental patent 
counts when coupled with a focus in countries with stronger environmental regulations than those of 
the MNC home country (i.e., business with high environmental pressure). This finding is consistent 
with prior research documenting the notion that good environmental performance is slowly 
incorporated into firm value (Derwall et al., 2005). Our results further indicate that environmental 
competitive advantages are creating value in the long run when MNCs use them to penetrate foreign 
markets with strong environmental regulations.  
We next explore different subsamples in order to gain more insight into the possible drivers 
of the above described, i.e., main results. We explore whether the results are industry-driven, i.e., more 
pronounced in industries that are subject to greater environmental pressure, or where there is greater 
demand for green innovation, such as polluting industries. We also investigate whether MNC home 
country characteristics are important in shaping an MNC’s ability to exploit its innovation efforts. 
Specifically, we use measures of investor protection, government effectiveness, and economic growth 
as proxies for a home country environment that fosters innovative activity. We show that the 
combination of green innovation and MNC exposure to high environmental regulation standards 
creates value in polluting industries only, which is consistent with the notion that environmental 
pressure is stronger in such industries. We also find that the value impact from green innovation’s 
coupling with environmental pressure only materializes if the MNC home country abides by the 
common law and has an effective government and a growing economy, all indicators of an innovation-
friendly home market environment. Interestingly, for MNCs from such home countries, green 
innovation can generate economic rents even when environmental pressure is low, albeit this effect is 
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just short term. Moreover, for MNCs from these home countries, which are also exposed to markets 
with high environmental standards, even non-green innovation can be value enhancing. Finally, we 
also find that non-green innovation coupled with exposure to high (low) environmental pressure can 
be value enhancing (reducing) in the short- and long-term (short term), unless the MNC’s exposure is 
in a polluting industry, in which case non-green innovation is always value enhancing. Overall, these 
findings suggest that innovation is value-enhancing when coupled with market exposure to 
environmental pressure.  
To mitigate concerns about endogeneity due to omitted variable(s), we run a test that exploits 
the 2005 launching of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the cornerstone of 
EU’s environmental policy aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.4 Effectively, the ETS raised 
the environmental compliance costs associated with doing business in the European Union. We 
compare firm value between two groups of U.S. firms in three years surrounding 2005. The first group 
(i.e., treatment group) consists of U.S. firms that have a high percentage of European foreign sales 
(i.e., whose European foreign sales are greater than the median value of our sample’s European foreign 
sales); the other group (i.e., control group) consists of U.S. firms that have no foreign sales (i.e., single-
geographic-segment U.S. firms). We find that green patents significantly increase treated group firms’ 
long-term value after the enforcement of the EU ETS. 
 Our study contributes to the literature that focuses on the merits of corporate 
internationalization by presenting empirical evidence that green technology development is a core 
source of value creation from multinationality.5 Our study highlights that technological knowhow 
                                                          
4 The EU ETS is applied to more than 11,000 manufacturing facilities and power stations residing in 31 European countries 
(28 EU members plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). The primary purpose of the EU ETS is limiting carbon 
emissions and imposing a cap for emission with heavy fines if firms produce emissions over their allowance. See this 
website: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en 
5 Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) find that MNCs increase capital expenditure compared with domestic firms upon a 
currency crisis. In a similar vein, Jang (2017) shows that MNCs are less likely to be financially constrained than single-
nation firms, especially when facing a financial crisis. Rego (2003) finds that MNCs are better able to pay lower taxes than 
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offers MNCs a competitive advantage in foreign markets, and that this advantage translates into excess 
value when environmental compliance costs reduce the level of competition. We further show that 
proactive environmental technology development is one of the mechanisms through which MNC 
intangibles can create value.  
Our findings also contribute to the literature that studies the impact of the environmental 
regulation stringency of corporate foreign markets on corporate innovation. Consistent with Porter 
(1991), Jaffe and Palmer (1997), and Calel and Dechezlepretre (2016), we find that domestic stringency 
of environmental policies is positively associated with green patent development. Our study further 
adds to the line of research documenting that the structure of foreign sales can affect the value impact 
of firms’ green patenting activities.  
Last, our research adds to the growing corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature in the 
sense that environmental sustainability is a part of CSR. Extant literature has shown mixed evidence 
on the effect of CSR on firm value. One line of research views (e.g., Frideman, 1970; Cheng, Hong, 
and Shue, 2013; Masulis and Reza, 2014; Kruger, 2015) CSR as a waste of shareholders’ resources, 
which are often disbursed by managers’ interests, whereas another line of research supports the notion 
that corporate social commitment (e.g., protecting the environment) not only increases short-term 
profit maximization (e.g., Flammer, 2013; Flammer, 2015) but also is a good long-term investment to 
build corporate reputation. Overall, our results are broadly consistent with the latter group of research 
studies in line with Jensen’s stakeholder theory (2001).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literatures. 
Section 3 describes the data and the sample. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes.  
                                                          
domestic firms. Further, Morck and Yeung (1991) demonstrate that MNCs with high levels of proprietary knowhow 
experience positive firm performance. 
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2. MNC strategy, green innovation, and their value implications 
Corporate business is becoming increasingly more global. According to the S&P 500 Dow Jones 
Indices, over 40% of total sales of companies in S&P 500 have been generated from foreign markets 
over the last decade.6 Among firms listed in Worldscope, about 25.1% of firms (15.8% of U.S. firms) 
are classified as multinational corporations7 in 1995, and the proportion increases to 51.3% (40.6%) 
in 2014. While international expansions offer better opportunities to grow, several additional risks also 
continue to arise. One of recent challenges associated with international business emerges from 
increasing worldwide efforts concerning environmental preservation. For multinational corporations, 
it is important to adjust corporate environmental strategies to meet the country-specific environmental 
standard of current and potential business partners.  
Inspired by the extant literature, we broadly sort corporate environmental strategies coping with 
global environmental pressure into two groups. First, it can be argued that, although corporate 
environmental commitment could help the environment, it also might hurt businesses by lowering 
corporate investment, decreasing production efficiency, impairing product market competition, and 
reducing, at least in the short-term, profitability. Extant literature (e.g., Gollop and Roberts, 1983; 
Murphy, 2004) also shares concerns that countries like the U.S., where stringent environmental 
standards are enforced, may curb domestic (manufacturing) firms’ abilities to compete in international 
product markets. Therefore, the first group of MNCs consists of those that undertake more evasive 
strategies aimed at minimizing the costs of environmental regulations. Those MNCs primarily attempt 
to exploit cross-country differences in environmental regulations costs by shifting facilities 
                                                          
6 https://us.spindices.com/indexology/djia-and-sp-500/sp-500-global-sales 
7 Multinational corporations are defined as if their foreign sales account for more than 20% of total sales (Denis et al., 
2002). 
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manufacturing toxic products to countries where environmental regulations are less strict than in their 
home country (i.e., pollution haven hypothesis) and by somewhat overlooking green innovation.8 Such 
strategy can have dual benefits. MNCs could not only save compliance costs by avoiding tight 
environmental regulations, which could result in attracting foreign investors (Xing and Kolstad, 2002), 
but could also avoid risky (going-green) projects embedded in high uncertainty about future cash flows.  
Some environmental advocates, however, warn that, ultimately, the above-described strategy 
may cause reputational damage for MNCs, which could be depicted as the main culprits that create 
the negative externality (i.e., aggravating pollution) that lowers social welfare in spite of the financial 
benefits of investing more in countries with less strict environmental regulations (i.e., “race to the 
bottom” in environmental quality). Accordingly, there exists a second group of MNCs consisting of 
firms more likely to take a proactive approach in preserving the environment, based on the expectation 
that corporate environmental performance can boost firm value or perhaps partly due to social 
pressure. Indeed, both anecdotal and empirical evidence support the notion of a positive relation 
between corporate environmental performance and profitability.9 This line of research, overall, shows 
                                                          
8 For example, a 1991 U.S. General Accounting Office survey documents that 2,675 wood furniture companies in Los 
Angeles moved their facilities to other areas in the United States or to Mexico to lower labor and environmental compliance 
costs. Keller and Levinson (2002) show that the state level pollution abatement costs are negatively associated with the 
inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), implying that foreign investment favors places where expenditures necessary to 
meet environmental requirements are lower.  
9 For example, the Guardian (see hyperlinks below) reports that DuPont reduced 65% of its greenhouse gas emissions 
over a recent 10-year period, resulting in $2.2 billion annual saving due to energy efficiency. Toyota has already started 
implementing an environmental action plan aiming to reduce vehicle emissions and improve fuel efficiency. The British 
Petroleum (BP)’s oil spill into the Gulf of Mexico and its failure to address environmental issues in a timely manner became 
an enormous financial liability. Recent studies also argue that MNCs can often conform to social pressure and become 
motivated to maintain a high level of environmental performance. Christmann and Taylor (2001) show that the level of 
foreign ownership and the percentage of sales to developed countries are positively associated with the adoption of ISO 
14000, a family of standards related to environmental management. Eskeland and Harrison (2003) find that foreign firms 
pollute less than domestic firms in developing countries. Christmann (2004) show that social pressure from corporate 
external stakeholders (e.g., government, industry, and customers) improves quality of internal corporate environmental 
management. 
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/environmentally-friendly-sustainable-business-profitable 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/04/bp-oil-spill-judge-grants-final-approval-20-billion-dollar-
settlement 
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that those MNCs that self-regulate their global businesses are more environmentally friendly and strive 
to develop green innovation.  
To gauge the effectiveness (in terms of their value implications) of corporate environmental 
strategies, we examine the firm-level green innovation that appears in patenting activities. Green 
innovation activities involve multidimensional plans and actions aimed at achieving a competitive 
advantage in product market (i.e., through green product development), along with preserving the 
environment in terms of energy savings, pollution reduction, and waste recycling (Arundel and Kemp, 
2009). Focusing on the economic effect10 of corporate green innovation, a growing body of literature 
has shown a positive link between good environmental management and market valuation (e.g., 
Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley, 2010; Guenster et al., 2011). Moreover, 
Fernando, Sharfman, and Uysal (2017) document that firms with low environment risk exhibit higher 
firm value than other matched firms by attracting environment-sensitive institutional investors. Russo 
and Fouts (1997) further argue that new investments aimed at transitioning to clean technology can 
lead to the redesign of the manufacturing process or final products and eventually to improved upward 
product market competitiveness. Han, Yu, and Kim (2019) find that strong environmental 
performance increases corporate brand image and, thus, customers’ loyalty in the airline industry. 
Equally importantly, the failure of conforming to environmental regulations could result in 
penalties, sanctions, or litigations. For instance, Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) show that, on 
average, firms experience market value losses of 1.68% on the announcement of environmental 
violation news, an effect similar to that of legal penalties. Chava (2011) finds a positive association 
between corporate environmental concerns and the cost of capital. Flammer (2013) show that the 
magnitude of the negative market reaction on corporate “eco-harmful” behavior increases over time, 
                                                          
10 Rugman and Verbeke (1998) show that the corporate response to environmental policies primarily depends on its 
expected economic benefits. 
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while that of the positive market reaction on corporate “eco-friendly” behavior decreases over the 
corresponding periods. Based on the aforementioned evidence, we can infer that taking actions to 
develop clean technology is imperative not only in terms of increasing firm value but also in terms of 
avoiding potential financial losses.  
The preceding discussion motivates the United States to investigate the value implications of 
green and non-green innovation that MNCs choose to adopt under varying degrees of global 
environmental pressure. Accordingly, we first examine whether the structure of foreign sales after 
conditioning on foreign market stringency of environmental standards is correlated with the intensity 
of MNCs’ green innovation activities. Subsequently, we test the hypothesis that foreign market 
location choice in conjunction with a firm’s innovation activities can have market value implications. 
Since environmental outperformance is only slowly incorporated into firm value (Derwall et al., 2005), 
we also check the time horizon over which green and non-green technology development coupled 
with a geographic focus (in high versus low environmental regulation compliance cost countries) is 
eventually capitalized into MNCs’ valuation.  
 
3. Data  
3-1) Environmental databases 
We construct our sample by combining information from several sources. First, we obtain the 
country-level environmental stringency index from the OECD website. 11  The index aggregates 
information on the domestic environment-related policies (e.g., environment-related taxes, feed-in-
tariff, and R&D subsidy) scored on a 0 (least stringent) to 6 scale (most stringent) for 29 countries (all 
23 OECD countries plus Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa) from 1990 to 2012. 
The index score, which measures the difference in the strength of environmental policies between the 
                                                          
11 https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EPS  
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headquarters and subsidiaries’ countries, is assigned to each country and year (Javier et al., 2012). To 
identify places where foreign sales take place, we obtain corporate sales information by geographic 
segment (e.g., the dollar value of sales per country) since 2002 from Factset.12 Because the main 
interest of our study is testing the effect of MNCs’ environmental performance on firm value, we 
limited our analysis to firms residing in those countries and delete corporate foreign sales outside the 
29 countries. 
Based on the information compiled, we create Foresale, which is the percentage of foreign sales 
for firm j in a given year as a proxy for level of internationalization. To distinguish different levels of 
environmental stringency, we construct two additional variables, namely, ForesaleHIGH and ForesaleLOW. 
Specifically, following Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), we define ForesaleHIGH (or ForesaleLOW) as the 
percentage of foreign sales that incur in countries whose environmental stringency is higher (or lower) 
than that of the corporate home country. These variables allow us to identify the extent of the MNCs’ 
foreign sales associated with the strength of environmental regulations. 
To measure MNCs’ green technology development, we use the patent applications reported 
in the Patent Network Dataverse managed by Harvard University.13 The database includes a patent’s 
applicant name, date, location, and class number for both U.S. and non-U.S. corporations for 26 years 
from 1975 to 2010. We conduct fuzzy matching, merging two databases by company names and 
locations, to link the unique patent number with GVKEY from Global Compustat. For ambiguous 
company names, we go through the matching manually. Thereafter, we classify patents as 
environment-related (or green) patents based on the primary class numbers14 as was done by Carrion-
                                                          
12 The Factset database provides geographically segmented corporate sales information for international firms since 2003. 
The Worldscope database by Thomson Financial also reports segmented corporate sales information since 1990, but about 
half of that is at the regional level. 
13 https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/patent 
 
14 The following patent class numbers indicate classification as an environmental patent; wind energy (242, 073, 180, 440, 
340, 343, 422, 280, 104, 374), solid waste prevention (137, 435, 165, 119, 210, 205, 405, 065), water pollution (405, 203, 
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Flores and Innes (2010), Popp and Newell (2012), and Amore and Bennedson (2016). We then proxy 
environmental innovations by counting the total number of granted green patent applications and 
using in our tests their log-transformed value in year t+1, t+2, and t+3, namely, Ln(GreenPat)t+1, 
Ln(GreenPat)t+2, and Ln(GreenPat)t+3, respectively. In our sample of firms, about 88.2% of all patents (or 
87.1% of green patents) are filed in countries where corporate headquarters reside. Most innovation 
studies suffer from truncation problems, which involve the significant lag (average two to three years) 
between the year of the application and the year the patent was granted. Therefore, around the end of 
the sample period, the number of patents reported in the data set might be underreported compared 
to the actual number of patents, since many patent applications filed during those years would still be 
under review and not yet granted. To address this problem, we adjusted the number of patents using 
a “weight factor,” i.e., by scaling the number of patents with the mean value of green patents in a 
given year and country (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenbert, 2001, 2005). After deleting firms in the finance 
industry and those with missing financial information, our final sample consists of 29,991 firm-year 
observations, across 20 countries spanning the period from 2002 to 2010. 
 
3-2) Financial databases 
We obtain financial and accounting information from Worldscope. To measure the long-term 
performance of multinational firms, we rely on Tobin’s q, which has been a widely utilized in the 
literature to examine the variation of firm value under different firm structures (Chung and Pruitt, 
1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995). Following Berger and Ofek (1995), we construct the Tobin’s q proxy 
as the sum of market value of equity, the liquidating value of preferred stock, and the book value of 
                                                          
210), Recycling (264, 201, 229, 460, 526, 106, 205, 425, 060, 075, 099, 100, 162, 164, 198, 210, 216, 266, 422, 431, 432, 502, 
523, 525, 902); alternative energy (204, 062, 228, 248, 425, 049, 428, 242, 222, 708, 976); alternative energy sources (062, 
425, 222); geothermal energy (060, 436); air pollution control (123, 060, 110, 422, 015, 044, 423); solid waste disposal (241, 
239, 523, 588, 137, 122, 976, 405); and solid waste control (060, 137, 976, 239, 165, 241, 075, 422, 266, 118, 119, 435, 210, 
405, 034, 122, 423, 205, 209, 065, 099, 162, 106, 203, 431) (Carrion-Flores and Innes, 2010) 
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debt divided by the book value of assets. Our tests’ main dependent variable is the industry-adjusted 
version of Tobin’s q, TobinQ_adj. As a robustness check, we also use the unadjusted Tobin’s q and 
excess value (i.e., ExcessVal) as alternative proxies of firm value. A firm’s excess value is computed as 
market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by sales. We also include a set of control 
variables in our analysis. Extant literature highlights the effect of industrial diversification on firm 
value. For instance, Berger and Ofek (1995) show that firms with multiple segments exhibit 13% to 
15% diversification discount compared to firms with a single segment. It might be the case that 
geographically diversified firms are highly likely to be industrially diversified as well. To address this 
issue, we construct the Herfindahl index based on the amount of sales on top-five products, namely, 
HHIPROD. The Worldscope database provides the segmented amount of sales per product as well as 
an SIC code associated with a product. High (low) value of HHIPROD indicates that firms are less (more) 
diversified in their industrial products. Additional control variables include the following firm 
characteristics: 1) Ln(MkCap), the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of year; 
2) ROA, earnings before interests and taxes divided by total assets; 3) Cash, cash divided by assets; 4) 
Leverage, long-term debts plus debts in current liabilities divided by total assets; 5) Tangibility, the net 
amount of property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets; 6) R&D, R&D intensity measured 
by the research and development expenditure divided by total assets; 7) HHIIND, the Herfindahl index 
based on sales across the first two digits of SIC code and some country variables. The country-level 
control variables are 8) Ln(GDPpa), log-transformed GDP per capita; 9) Trade, imports minus export 
divided by GDP; 10) RuleLaw, the index that measures quality of domestic laws; 11) EPS, 
environmental stringency index; 12) PPindex, intellectual property protection index; 13) Educ, public 
spending on R&D educations divided by GDP. In addition, Ln(GpatStock)[t-1,t], Ln(GpatStock)[t-3,t], and 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-5,t], are the log-transformed cumulative number of green patents from year t-N (N=1, 3, 
and 5) to year t by adding one. All variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentile values. 
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3-3) Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides detailed summary statistics. The median value of adjusted Tobin’s q and 
excess value is slightly different from zero, which is consistent with the findings in Berger and Ofek 
(1995). The average percentage of foreign sales is about 27.5% for a typical firm, with 12.4% of them 
from the countries with more stringent environmental protection laws and the remaining 15% from 
the countries with less stringent environmental protection laws.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
In Table 2, we report mean values of the environmental stringency index, foreign sales, and 
green innovations by country. In our sample of firms, the country with strictest environmental 
protection law is Denmark with an EPS score of 3.56. On the other end of the spectrum, the country 
with the worst environmental protection law is Japan with an EPS score of 1.88. Sample firms from 
Switzerland, Denmark, and Ireland have high average foreign sales ratios, over 70% of total sales. 
Whereas Danish firms’ foreign sales come primarily (almost 69%) from countries with less stringent 
environmental protection, Irish firms’ foreign sales are mostly (53%) from countries with more 
stringent environmental protection. U.S. firms account for over 61.5% of our sample with an average 
ForesaleHIGH of 12% and an average of ForesaleLOW of 8%. On average, among the firms from the 
different countries in our sample, Danish (Greek) firms engage the most (least) in green technology 
development. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
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4. Empirical Results 
4-1) Green technology developments 
Christmann (2004) proposes two competing hypotheses on the role of MNCs in protecting 
the natural environment. On the one hand, MNCs are incentivized to exploit different environmental 
standards across countries by manufacturing “dirty” products in foreign countries with lax 
environmental regulations. On the other hand, faced with a different level of social pressure from 
stakeholders such as customers, MNCs are perhaps motivated to be proactive in protecting the 
environment and perhaps even to benefit from positively influencing public perception.  
As such, we first test whether the structures of foreign sales, ForesaleHIGH and ForesaleLOW, 
promote or demote MNCs’ green innovation development. To measure a firm’s green innovation 
activities, we count the number of applied patent applications related to environmental protection15 
(Carrion-Flores and Innes, 2010; and others) and use it by log-transforming its value plus one, 
Ln(GreenPat)t+N (N=1, 2, 3).  
Table 3 reports the detailed results. From Column (1) to (3), the coefficients of ForesaleHIGH are 
all positive and significant at the 1% level. More specifically, a one standard deviation increase in 
ForesaleHIGH corresponds to an increase of about 3.35 (3.98)% in green patent applications at year t+1 
(t+3). The result supports the viewpoint that MNCs actively engage in green technology development 
if they have many clients in countries with high environmental standards. We find opposite results 
with ForesaleLOW. The coefficients of ForesaleLOW are all negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
                                                          
15  Some examples on the patent applications associated with environment are as follows: 1) A process for the 
desulfurization of a sulfurous acid gas-containing waste gas by blowing the waste contact into an absorbing liquid through 
a plurality of sparger pipes is disclosed, wherein various operation conditions are specifically… (class:423); 2) The invention 
relates to a process for ex situ presulfurization of porous particles of a hydrocarbon hydroconversion catalyst that contains 
at least one metal or metal oxide, comprising bringing catalytic particles … (class:502); and 3) A refuse recycling system, 
which recycles municipal waste as energy, includes a shredder for shredding the waste and removing rejects via a feed pipe 
to a circulating fluidized bed reactor, the reactor producing flue gases. The reactor includes (class:110) 
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level suggesting that MNCs are less likely to engage in green innovation if a high percentage of their 
customers reside in countries with lax environmental requirements. Moreover, MNCs’ green 
technology development increases with capital expenditures (i.e., manufacturing firms) and trading 
volume and also when the MNCs’ home countries have high quality of rule and legal system, high 
spending on R&D education, and domestic stringency of environmental policies. These findings imply 
that the most significant determinants of corporate green innovation are institutional [also see 
Carlsson (2006)] rather than firm-specific factors, which contrast the findings in Francis et al. (2018). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
4-2) Effect of green innovation on firm value  
In this section, we test whether and how MNCs’ green innovation is translated into firm value. 
More specifically, we construct the following model: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒(%)
𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽
2
𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘)
[𝑡−𝑁,1]
+
𝛽
3
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒(%)𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑜𝑟 𝐿𝑜𝑤 x 𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘)[𝑡−𝑁,𝑡] + 𝛽4𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖                                                  (1) 
where i still denotes a firm, and t denotes a year. To capture a firm’s short- and long-term green 
innovation development, we construct green innovation stocks at the firm level by accumulating 
granted patents during the past 1, 3, 5, or 7 years, Ln(GpatStock)[t-N, t] (N=1, 3, 5, 7). We then regress 
the interaction term between Foresale and Ln(GpatStock)[t-N, t] on firm value to see the effect of green 
innovation conditioning on the type of foreign sale, ForesaleHIGH or ForesaleLOW, on firm value. Extant 
literature has documented the source of value creation for corporate internationalization if MNCs 
hold intangible assets that give a firm a competitive advantage in foreign markets (e.g., Morck and 
Yeung, 1991). To control for general innovation, we also include the interaction term of Foresale and 
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Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t], where Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] is the log-transformed cumulative number of nongreen 
patents from year t-N to year t. Table 4 provides the detailed results. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------- 
In the models shown in Columns (1) to (4), we use ForesaleHIGH interacted with green (and 
nongreen) innovation to see its influence on firm value. In Column (1), we find that the coefficient of 
the interaction term between ForesaleHIGH and Ln(GpatStock)[t-1, t] is -0.232, indicating that green 
technology coupled with foreign sales that occur in countries with high environmental standards is 
associated with lower firm value. However, innovation may not have an immediate effect on firm 
value but take some time to have an impact. To address time effect, we construct variables that capture 
3-, 5-, and 7-year cumulative numbers of patents, Ln(GpatStock)[t-3,t], Ln(GpatStock)[t-5,t], and 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-7, t],  respectively. Consistent with this view, when MNCs accumulate green technology 
up to seven years, we find that green technology adds value to MNCs. In Column (4), the coefficient 
of ForesaleHIGH x Ln(GpatStock)[t-7, t] is 0.120. An increase by a standard deviation of Ln(GpatStock)[t-7, t] 
and ForesaleHIGH for our average sample of firm leads to increase in Tobin’s q by 0.351 (=0.12*0.17*1.72) 
in seven years. Overall, we find that green innovations coupled with exposure to strict environmental 
standards does not increase a firm’s performance in the short run but in the long run, which is 
consistent with Derwall et al.’s view (2005). Notably, this significant effect is obtained after controlling 
for non-green innovation (i.e., NGpatstock) and research input (i.e., R&D). We also find that the 
coefficient of the interaction term ForesaleHIGH x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] is positive but with a decreasing 
pattern. This pattern indicates that even MNCs’ non-green innovation can create value in foreign 
markets with high environmental standards; however, the decaying pattern indicates that this effect is 
not sustainable in the long run.  In Columns (5) to (8), we repeat our analyses with ForesaleLOW and find 
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mostly insignificant or somewhat opposite results. The coefficient of ForesaleLOW x Ln(GpatStock)[t-1, t] is 
positive and significant in the short term; in the long term, however, the effect becomes statistically 
insignificant, as shown in Columns (6) to (8). Foreign sales that take place in countries with less-
stringent environmental regulations do not generate any long-term value with either green or non-
green innovation.  
 
4-3) Subsample analysis 
In this section, we investigate whether a firm’s industry membership as well as its headquarter 
(home) country’s innovation infrastructure (proxied by measures of institutional governance quality, 
government effectiveness, and economic growth) matters for our results.  
We begin by splitting our sample of firms into firms in polluting industries and nonpolluting 
industries to account for the degree of environmental pressure the firm is facing from doing business 
in certain industries (e.g., lead-acid-battery manufacturing industry) known to have been contributing 
to environmental pollution more than others. For the purpose of polluting industries’ classification, 
we obtain toxic-chemical-release data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency16 and calculate 
the total amount of toxic chemical release per industry, where industry is defined based on four-digit 
SIC codes.17 We classified all industries into two groups: 1) polluting industries if the amount of toxic 
chemical releases by establishments in a given industry is in the top tercile ranking based on the 
amount of toxic chemical releases by establishments of all industries each year; 2) nonpolluting 
industries. Consequently, our sample of firms belongs to either polluting or nonpolluting industries. 
We then repeat our analyses separately via polluting and nonpolluting industries’ subsamples in Panel 
                                                          
16 https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/tri-basic-data-files-calendar-years-1987-2017 
17 The rationale for this classification scheme is the following: if U.S. firms in a certain industry are more likely to pollute, 
non-U.S. firms in a given industry are also more likely to pollute, which is rooted on the idea of Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
who measure both U.S. and non-U.S. firms’ external financial dependence based on U.S. industry characteristics. 
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A of Table 5. We find that, in polluting industries, green patent stocks in conjunction with expanding 
operations in countries with high environmental standards yield long-term value. In addition, non-
green patent stocks are associated with value creation when accumulated in conjunction with an 
expansion of foreign operations, regardless of whether this expansion is in countries with high or low 
environmental standards. This pattern is somewhat consistent with our prior findings, as shown in 
Table 4. When we repeat the test for the subsample of firms in nonpolluting industries, we find no 
significant effects. In short, our findings from Panel A of Table 5 suggest that green innovation is 
more valuable to firms in polluting industries than nonpolluting industries, i.e., when environmental 
pressure becomes more binding. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Next, we examine three factors that can be important in the way the MNC is pursuing 
innovation. First, we recognize that corporate social activities (e.g., developing green technology) offer 
a host of opportunities for a manager to misuse shareholders’ wealth (Friedman, 1970). Kruger (2015) 
also finds that market reactions on the announcement of CSR news associated with agency problems 
are on average negative. Therefore, we investigate the co-effect of the type of foreign involvement 
and green technology knowhow on firm value by institutional governance quality. To measure quality 
of institutional governance, we use the legal origin of the corporate headquarters’ home country.  Liang 
and Renneboog (2017) show that the legal origin is one the most influential factors that determines 
corporate social commitment. La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) demonstrate that 
common-law countries offer better legal protections of shareholders than civil-law countries. If better 
investor protection is associated with lower agency costs, we then expect that MNCs from common-
law countries would pursue innovation in a more sustainable and long-term value enhancing manner.  
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Panel B of Table 5 presents the valuation results by civil-law vs. common-law countries’ 
subsamples. We find that the combined effect of green innovation with ForesaleHIGH on firm value in 
civil-law countries is not significantly associated with firm value. We interpret this result as consistent 
with the view that corporate social responsibility may be subject to agency problems and, thus, is not 
directly value relevant. However, we find a positive and significant effect of green innovation with 
ForesaleHIGH on firm value in common-law countries, which is consistent with the notion that 
innovation efforts are less likely to be hampered by agency issues rooted in the degree of shareholders’ 
rights protection.   
Furthermore, Christmann (2004) show that social pressure from corporate external 
stakeholders, such as governments, improves the quality of internal corporate environmental 
management.  Accordingly, we expect the effect of green innovation to be better reflected in firm 
value when there is a higher level of effectiveness in implementing a government’s policies. To test if 
the valuation effects we focus on vary by the degree of the MNC’s home government effectiveness, 
we repeat our tests for subsamples of firms from countries of high and low government effectiveness, 
as shown in Panel C of Table 5. All countries are classified into one of two groups (i.e., countries with 
more effective and less effective government) based on the median value of worldwide governance 
indicators (WGI) score that measures each country’s government effectiveness every year. We find 
that the positive association between green innovation with ForesaleHIGH and firm value is more evident 
for MNCs headquartered in countries with high government effectiveness scores. Similar to Table 4, 
the combined effect of green innovation with ForesaleHIGH on firm value turns positive, once a firm 
accumulates at least three years of green technology knowhow. However, the valuation effect is much 
weaker for MNCs from countries with low government effectiveness than for MNCs from countries 
with high government effectiveness. Our result suggests that the MNCs’ home country government 
plays an important role in determining the quality of its corporate environmental strategies. Overall, 
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our findings are consistent with the viewpoints found in the existing studies (e.g., Christmann, 2004; 
Kim et al., 2019).  
 Finally, according to the technology life-cycle model (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), 
technology development (or innovation) within the firm takes place at different rates as the firm grows. 
The risk associated with innovation could be mitigated when the firm’s life cycle reaches its peak point. 
Russo and Fouts (1997) show evidence in line with the technology life-cycle model, i.e., a relation 
between corporate environmental performance and financial performance is more pronounced for 
firms in high-growth industries than low-growth industries. Similarly, we investigate whether the 
country-level GDP growth18 exacerbates or alleviates the association between green innovation and 
firm value. Countries hosting firms with higher-quality patents have higher economic growth (Hasan 
and Tucci, 2010). Accordingly, we re-run the valuation regressions used in Table 4 by splitting our 
sample into firms headquartered in high vs. low GDP countries based on the median value of the 
GDP growth rate each year. In Panel D of Table 5, we show that the positive association of green 
innovation and firm value only appears for firms in high GDP countries, whereas we find little relation 
among firms in countries with low GDP. This finding corroborates with Hasan and Tucci (2010) and 
indicates that the MNC home country economic growth provides a springboard for long-term 
accumulation of economic rents from pursuing green innovation. 
 
4-4) Empirical identification  
 Up to this point, we show that green technology development increases firm value, particularly 
when MNCs have a high percentage of foreign sales in countries with strict environment standards. 
                                                          
18 We obtained the annual gross domestic products from the OECD website (https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-
product-gdp.htm) and calculate a growth rate as (GDPi,t- GDPi,t-1)/ GDPi,t-1, where i represents a country and t represents 
year. 
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However, our results cannot completely rule out an omitted variables criticism, e.g., the case that some 
unobservable factor(s) other than environmental regulation may encourage firms to be innovative and 
profitable. To mitigate this endogeneity concern, we design a difference-in-differences regression 
around the time of a structural shift in the environmental regulations’ compliance costs in the 
European Union as follows. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) was launched 
in 2005 and is the cornerstone of the European environmental policy geared toward reducing green 
gas emissions. By exploiting the launching of EU ETS as an exogenous shock that resulted in 
externally strengthening environmental regulations, we compare green innovations’ effect on firm 
value between two groups of U.S. firms in the years surrounding 2005. The first group (i.e., treatment 
group) consists of U.S. firms that have a high percentage of European foreign sales (i.e., whose 
European foreign sales are greater than the median value of European foreign sales among our sample 
of firms each year), and the other group (i.e., control group) includes U.S. firms that have no foreign 
sales.19 Our testing window spans the three years before, on, and after 2005, the year the EU ETS is 
launched. We then investigate how this heightened environmental regulation affects firm value 
association with corporate green technology knowhow. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 Table 6 reports the detailed results of our analysis. We find that green patent stocks increase 
firm value, especially for the treatment group after the enforcement of the EU ETS. The long-term 
nature of this effect is reflected in that the positive effect becomes statistically significant when the 
                                                          
19 We drop U.S. firms that have a low percentage of European foreign sales (i.e., whose European foreign sales are less 
than the median value of the European foreign sales) and European firms that have cleaner treatment and control groups 
for our test. 
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firm accumulates green technology knowhow over five years or more. In nontabulated results, we find 
no significance when we conduct the same set of tests with non-green patents stocks. Calel and 
Dechezlepretre (2016) show that European firms increased low-carbon patenting after 2005, the 
enforcement year of the EU ETS. Overall, we conclude that the pursuit of green technology 
development adds value to MNCs when environmental regulations in the MNCs’ foreign markets 
become tighter.  
 
4-5) Sensitivity analyses  
As a last set of tests, we use alternative variables to measure firm value. Specifically, instead of 
the industry-adjusted version of Tobin’s q, we now use the raw measure (Tobin’s Q) as well as the 
excess value (ExcessVal).  Panel A of Table 7 shows that the coefficient of ForesaleHIGH is negative and 
significant, indicating that internationalization into foreign countries with environmental standards is 
higher than that of the firm’s home country and hurts firm value. However, the coefficient of 
ForesaleLOW is positive and insignificant. In Panel B, the relation among green patent stocks, foreign 
sales, and firm value still exists and exhibits a similar pattern, as shown in Table 4. We conclude that 
our findings are robust to potential measurement errors that could exist in our value-based measures 
of firm performance. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. Conclusion 
We investigate how the geographic scope and corporate environmental strategy of MNCs 
combine into generating economic rents. We find that a high exposure to foreign markets with more 
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(less) stringent environmental regulations stimulates (stymies) MNCs’ green patent applications. A 
large percentage of sales in foreign markets with more (less) stringent environmental regulations is 
associated with lower (higher) market valuation. MNCs’ environmental competitive advantage 
obtained through green innovation activities increases firm value when pursued in conjunction with 
foreign involvement in countries with strict environmental standards. This effect is more profound 
for firms operating in polluted industries than in non-polluted industries and when the MNC’s home 
country institutions and economic conditions support the adoption of sound policies of technology 
development. Overall, our study highlights that green technology development is at the core of 
multinationality’s effect on corporate valuation.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on 30,881 firm-year observations for this study. TobinQ_adj is 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, computed as the sum of market value of equity, the liquidating value of 
preferred stock, and the value of debts divided by the book value of assets (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). 
ExcessVal is computed as the market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by sales. 
Foresale is the percentage of foreign sales for firm j in a given year. ForesaleHIGH (or ForesaleLOW) is the 
percentage of foreign sales that incur sales in countries whose environmental stringency is higher (or 
lower) than that of corporate home country. Ln(GreenPat)t+N is the log-transformed number of green 
patents plus one applied in a given year at t+N (N=1, 2, and 3) (Carrion-Flores and Innes, 2010). 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] (Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t]) is the log-transformed cumulative number of green (or nongreen) 
patents plus one from year t-N (N=1, 3, 5, and 7) to year t (Furman, Porter, and Stern, 2002). HHIPROD 
is the Herfindahl index based on sales of a firm j’s top-five products. Ln(MkCap) is the U.S. dollar 
denominated market value of equity at the end of year. ROA is earnings before interests and taxes 
divided by assets. Cash is cash divided by assets. Leverage is long-term debts plus debts in current 
liabilities divided by assets. Tangibility is the net amount of property, plant, and equipment divided by 
asset. R&D is R&D expenditure divided assets. HHIIND is the Herfindahl index based on sales across 
the first two digit of SIC code. Ln(GDPpa) is log-transformed GDP per annum. Trade is imports minus 
export divided by GDP. RuleLaw is the index that measures quality of domestic laws. EPS is 
environmental stringency index. PPindex is intellectual property protection index. Educ is public 
spending on R&D educations divided by GDP. 
 
  N Mean Median SD 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 
TobinQ_adj 29,991 0.36 -0.03 1.38 -0.33 0.51 
ExcessVal 29,912 2.15 -0.03 12.11 -0.36 0.62 
Foresale 29,991 0.28 0.17 0.30 0.00 0.48 
ForesaleHIGH 29,991 0.13 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.19 
ForesaleLOW 29,991 0.15 0.04 0.23 0.00 0.20 
Ln(GreenPat) t+1 24,234 0.16 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 
Ln(GreenPat)t+2 18,338 0.16 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00 
Ln(GreenPat)t+3 14,048 0.15 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-1,t] 29,991 0.13 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-3,t] 29,991 0.28 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-5,t] 29,991 0.40 0.00 1.07 0.00 0.00 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-7,t] 29,991 0.50 0.00 1.21 0.00 0.00 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-1,t] 29,991 0.30 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-3,t] 29,991 0.58 0.00 1.34 0.00 0.00 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-5,t] 29,991 0.77 0.00 1.57 0.00 0.69 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-7,t] 29,991 0.90 0.00 1.72 0.00 0.00 
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HHIPROD 29,991 0.72 0.74 0.27 4.76 7.62 
Ln(MkCap) 29,991 6.20 6.15 2.07 0.01 0.11 
ROA 29,991 0.03 0.06 0.20 0.04 0.27 
Cash 29,991 0.19 0.12 0.20 0.02 0.32 
Leverage 29,991 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.08 0.37 
Tangibility 29,991 0.26 0.19 0.22 0.48 1.00 
R&D 29,991 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.04 
HHIIND 29,991 0.16 0.09 0.18 0.06 0.18 
Ln(GDPpa) 29,991 4.47 3.87 1.59 3.85 3.90 
Trade 29,991 -2.32 -3.43 3.64 -4.96 0.45 
RuleLaw 29,991 1.54 1.57 0.19 1.45 1.63 
EPS 29,991 2.19 2.34 0.73 1.67 2.68 
PPindex 29,991 4.77 4.88 0.16 4.67 4.88 
Educ 29,991 0.42 0.39 0.10 0.36 0.42 
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Table 2 
Sample Distribution by Country 
 
This table shows the mean value of EPS, Foresale, ForesaleHIGH, ForesaleLOW, and Ln(GreenPat)  by country. 
The time-varying EPS index score is obtained from the OECD website 
(https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EPS).  
 
Country N EPS Foresale 
ForesaleHIG
H 
ForesaleLOW Ln(GreenPat) 
AUT 81 3.09 0.64 0.11 0.54 0.04 
AUS 884 2.44 0.26 0.16 0.10 0.01 
BEL 145 2.45 0.63 0.44 0.19 0.16 
CAN 1,268 3.04 0.46 0.04 0.42 0.08 
CHE 229 3.03 0.71 0.15 0.55 0.09 
DEU 955 2.87 0.48 0.14 0.34 0.17 
DNK 113 3.56 0.77 0.08 0.69 0.29 
ESP 165 2.82 0.39 0.13 0.26 0.03 
FIN 171 3.14 0.64 0.12 0.52 0.07 
FRA 838 3.09 0.52 0.09 0.43 0.08 
GBR 1,243 2.74 0.49 0.23 0.26 0.03 
GRC 81 2.13 0.25 0.20 0.05 0.00 
IRL 90 2.05 0.70 0.53 0.19 0.16 
ITA 281 2.68 0.42 0.21 0.21 0.08 
JPN 4,216 1.88 0.23 0.11 0.13 0.17 
NLD 216 3.24 0.63 0.10 0.53 0.19 
NOR 164 2.93 0.62 0.21 0.41 0.09 
PRT 51 2.41 0.41 0.33 0.10 0.00 
SWE 345 3.11 0.67 0.18 0.50 0.03 
USA 18,455 2.00 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.14 
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Table 3 
Internationalization and Green Innovation 
 
The table presents OLS results where the dependent variable is Ln(GreenPat)t+N, the log-transformed 
number of green patents at year t+N (N=1, 2, and 3). ForesaleHIGH (or ForesaleLOW) is the percentage of 
foreign sales (in total sales) that incur sales in countries whose environmental stringency is higher (or 
lower) than that of corporate home country. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The 
numbers shown in parentheses are t-statistics clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent variable: Ln(GreenPat)t+N 
  N=1 N=2 N=3 N=1 N=2 N=3 
ForesaleHIGH 0.194*** 0.231*** 0.230***    
 (4.72) (4.38) (3.88)    
ForesaleLOW    -0.292*** -0.259*** -0.430*** 
    (-6.04) (-4.75) (-6.26) 
HHIPROD -0.021 0.030 0.031 -0.020 0.029 0.030 
 (-0.68) (0.79) (0.72) (-0.68) (0.78) (0.70) 
Ln(MkCap) 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.005 0.008 0.011 
 (1.06) (1.14) (1.28) (0.94) (1.11) (1.35) 
ROA -0.005 -0.059 -0.100** -0.001 -0.057 -0.094** 
 (-0.16) (-1.55) (-2.19) (-0.04) (-1.50) (-2.08) 
Cash -0.056 -0.040 0.018 -0.063* -0.049 0.006 
 (-1.48) (-0.88) (0.33) (-1.67) (-1.08) (0.12) 
Leverage -0.018 0.045 0.092* -0.021 0.044 0.092** 
 (-0.52) (1.18) (1.95) (-0.60) (1.14) (1.96) 
Tangibility 0.124** 0.043 0.063 0.118** 0.037 0.051 
 (2.27) (0.63) (0.81) (2.19) (0.56) (0.65) 
R&D -0.087 -0.129 -0.047 -0.094 -0.137 -0.055 
 (-0.93) (-1.30) (-0.32) (-1.00) (-1.38) (-0.36) 
HHIIND 0.095 0.328 0.731** 0.093 0.329 0.698** 
 (0.47) (1.23) (2.12) (0.46) (1.23) (2.00) 
Ln(GDPpa) 0.802 -3.462** -6.299** 0.711 -3.447** -6.213** 
 (1.23) (-2.07) (-2.46) (1.09) (-2.06) (-2.43) 
Trade 0.018*** 0.028 -0.020 0.018*** 0.028 -0.023 
 (3.41) (1.26) (-0.67) (3.30) (1.25) (-0.76) 
RuleLaw 0.614*** 0.607* -0.126 0.600*** 0.590* -0.162 
 (2.68) (1.95) (-0.49) (2.63) (1.90) (-0.62) 
EPS 0.109*** 0.126*** 0.093** 0.125*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 
 (4.03) (3.49) (2.05) (4.42) (3.61) (2.85) 
Ppindex -1.036 0.060 -0.167 -0.986 0.101 -0.133 
 (-1.36) (0.05) (-0.12) (-1.31) (0.09) (-0.10) 
Educ 0.720 1.758** 0.152 0.680 1.783** 0.098 
 (1.61) (1.97) (0.09) (1.52) (1.99) (0.06) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 24,234 18,338 14,048 24,234 18,338 14,048 
Adj. R-squared 0.612 0.607 0.574 0.612 0.607 0.576 
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Table 4 
Green Innovation and Firm Performance 
 
This table presents OLS results where the dependent variable is TobinQ_adj, industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Columns (1) to (4) use ForesaleHIGH 
as a proxy for foreign sales. Columns (5) to (8) use ForesaleLOW as a proxy for foreign sales. Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] (or Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] ) is the 
cumulative number of green (nongreen) patents from year t-N (N=1, 3, 5, and 7) to year t and log-transformed after adding one (Furman, 
Porter, and Stern, 2002). All regressions included firm and year fixed effects, but coefficients are omitted to report. The numbers shown in 
parentheses are t-statistics clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  ForesaleHIGH ForesaleLOW 
  Dependent variable: TobinQ_adj 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -0.262*** -0.317*** -0.320*** -0.309*** 0.170*** 0.135* 0.158** 0.157** 
 (-3.77) (-4.33) (-4.28) (-4.13) (2.61) (1.90) (2.30) (2.27) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.029 -0.016 -0.050 -0.063 -0.073** -0.051 -0.035 -0.050 
 (0.72) (-0.41) (-1.32) (-1.35) (-2.01) (-1.20) (-0.88) (-1.05) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.232* -0.086 0.114*** 0.120*** 0.273** 0.117 0.006 0.027 
 (-1.78) (-0.82) (3.30) (3.71) (2.41) (0.88) (0.15) (0.66) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.024 -0.025 -0.038 -0.061 0.064** 0.016 -0.022 -0.052 
 (-0.99) (-0.86) (-1.10) (-1.42) (2.46) (0.49) (-0.63) (-1.19) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.235*** 0.170** 0.068** 0.041* -0.192*** -0.058 -0.028 -0.035 
 (2.79) (2.41) (2.42) (1.70) (-3.04) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.76) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering SD YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 
Adj. R-squared 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 
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Table 5 
Subsample Analysis 
 
This table presents the results of subsample analyses. Reported are OLS regression results where the 
dependent variable is TobinQ_adj, industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] (or Ln(NGpatStock)[t-
N,t] ) is the cumulative number of green (nongreen) patents from year t-N (N=1, 3, 5, and 7) to year t 
and log-transformed by adding one (Furman, Porter, and Stern, 2002). All regressions include the 
same set of control variables used in Table 3, firm and year fixed effects, but coefficients are not 
reported. Columns (1) to (4) use ForesaleHIGH as a proxy for foreign sales. Columns (5) to (8) use 
ForesaleLOW as a proxy for foreign sales.  
 
Panel A shows the analysis for subsamples formed based on the industry level of pollution: polluting 
vs. nonpolluting industries. To measure the industry level of pollution, we use the total amount of 
toxic chemical release per industry where industry is defined based on four-digit SIC codes from the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Industries are classified as polluting industries if the amount 
of toxic chemical releases by establishments in a given industry in is in the top tercile ranking based 
on the amount of toxic chemical releases by establishments in all industries each year, and nonpolluting 
industries otherwise.   
 
Panel B presents subsamples formed on the basis of the legal system in the MNC’s home country. 
The subsamples are thus those of MNCs from common law and from civil law countries.  
 
Panel C presents subsamples formed based on the MNC home country’s government effectiveness 
score. We distinguish between high (above median) and a low (below median) government 
effectiveness subsamples based on the median value of worldwide governance indicators (WGI) score 
that measures each country’s government effectiveness score every year.  
 
Panel D presents subsamples based on MNC home country economic (GDP) growth. We obtained 
the annual gross domestic products from the OECD website (https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-
domestic-product-gdp.htm) and calculate a growth rate as (GDPi,t-GDPi,t-1)/GDPi,t-1, where i 
represents a country and t represents year. The number shown in parentheses are t-values clustered at 
the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A. Polluting vs. Nonpolluting Industry 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ForesaleHIGH ForesaleLOW 
  Polluting Industries 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -0.242* -0.386** -0.389** -0.344** 0.164 0.176 0.189 0.163 
 (-1.77) (-2.53) (-2.43) (-2.15) (1.28) (1.29) (1.36) (1.16) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.002 -0.000 -0.006 -0.003 -0.041 -0.040 0.009 0.012 
 (0.05) (-0.00) (-0.10) (-0.05) (-1.00) (-0.79) (0.15) (0.16) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.179 -0.103 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.026 0.106 0.017 0.022 
 (-1.22) (-0.83) (3.78) (3.70) (0.30) (1.38) (0.44) (0.56) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.002 -0.061 -0.130** -0.206*** 0.020 -0.049 -0.127** -0.208*** 
 (-0.05) (-1.30) (-2.21) (-2.89) (0.58) (-1.14) (-2.17) (-2.92) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.227** 0.231** 0.102** 0.058 0.124* 0.156*** 0.083** 0.052 
 (2.07) (2.53) (2.56) (1.64) (1.80) (2.96) (2.07) (1.38) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 10,006 10,006 10,006 19,985 10,006 10,006 10,006 10,006 
Adj. R-squared 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.675 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.601 
  Nonpolluting Industries 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -0.281*** -0.287*** -0.289*** -0.293*** 0.118* 0.108 0.128* 0.122* 
 (-3.76) (-3.81) (-3.77) (-3.75) (1.78) (1.60) (1.93) (1.82) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.068 -0.017 -0.072 -0.091 -0.041 -0.058 -0.060 -0.079 
 (1.03) (-0.29) (-1.42) (-1.50) (-0.84) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.25) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.317 -0.073 0.074 0.088 0.221 0.161 -0.009 0.007 
 (-1.28) (-0.37) (0.98) (1.35) (1.33) (1.62) (-0.22) (0.17) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.038 0.010 0.033 0.049 -0.015 0.015 0.039 0.051 
 (-1.14) (0.26) (0.84) (0.96) (-0.55) (0.48) (0.99) (1.00) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.248* 0.102 0.035 0.026 0.126 0.073 0.004 0.007 
 (1.77) (0.83) (0.65) (0.60) (1.36) (1.05) (0.06) (0.13) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 10,006 10,006 10,006 19,985 19,985 19,985 19,985 19,985 
Adj. R-squared 0.675 0.675 0.675 0.675 0.674 0.674 0.674 0.674 
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Panel B. Civil vs. Common Law Countries 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ForesaleHIGH ForesaleLOW 
  Civil-Law Countries 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -0.098 -0.134 -0.116 -0.095 0.134 0.119 0.135 0.133 
 (-1.29) (-1.57) (-1.35) (-1.16) (1.63) (1.37) (1.58) (1.58) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.013 -0.002 -0.009 -0.037 -0.042 0.025 0.032 -0.006 
 (-0.26) (-0.06) (-0.25) (-0.66) (-1.55) (0.52) (0.77) (-0.10) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.048 -0.057 0.035 0.018 0.054 -0.111 -0.107** -0.079** 
 (-0.29) (-0.44) (1.11) (0.59) (0.57) (-0.73) (-2.57) (-1.97) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.000 -0.021 -0.029 -0.053 0.034* -0.029 -0.046 -0.067 
 (0.00) (-0.68) (-0.72) (-1.14) (1.84) (-0.62) (-1.06) (-1.41) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.056 0.073 0.010 -0.003 -0.063 0.065 0.066 0.051 
 (0.42) (0.71) (0.38) (-0.11) (-1.02) (0.55) (1.40) (1.11) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,051 8,051 8,051 8,051 8,051 8,051 8,051 8,051 
Adj. R-squared 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.792 
 Common-Law Countries 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -0.325*** -0.383*** -0.393*** -0.382*** 0.185** 0.145 0.174* 0.171* 
 (-3.40) (-3.92) (-3.97) (-3.88) (2.12) (1.56) (1.94) (1.89) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.052 -0.031 -0.072 -0.081 -0.099** -0.077 -0.065 -0.071 
 (0.90) (-0.56) (-1.56) (-1.49) (-2.23) (-1.52) (-1.33) (-1.26) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.322* -0.071 0.164*** 0.192*** 0.590*** 0.322 0.142* 0.140* 
 (-1.78) (-0.46) (2.89) (3.60) (2.62) (1.60) (1.82) (1.79) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.024 -0.026 -0.042 -0.063 0.069** 0.023 -0.018 -0.049 
 (-0.81) (-0.75) (-1.04) (-1.26) (2.30) (0.63) (-0.44) (-0.98) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.255*** 0.187** 0.078* 0.036 -0.253*** -0.105 -0.090 -0.083 
 (2.58) (2.13) (1.66) (0.88) (-2.95) (-0.83) (-1.31) (-1.23) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21,940 21,940 21,940 21,940 21,940 21,940 21,940 21,940 
Adj. R-squared 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.631 
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Panel C. High vs. Low Government Effectiveness 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ForesaleHIGH ForesaleLOW 
  More Effective 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -0.572*** -0.598*** -0.578*** -0.566*** 0.334*** 0.299** 0.336*** 0.334*** 
 (-4.70) (-4.80) (-4.71) (-4.67) (2.97) (2.48) (2.87) (2.83) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.070 -0.045 -0.115* -0.091 -0.096* -0.127* -0.119* -0.094 
 (0.88) (-0.68) (-1.82) (-1.27) (-1.76) (-1.89) (-1.79) (-1.27) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.433** -0.243 0.128** 0.147** 0.486** 0.242 0.113 0.109 
 (-2.07) (-1.34) (2.06) (2.31) (1.98) (1.00) (1.64) (1.59) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.053 -0.016 -0.003 -0.050 0.061 0.050 0.034 -0.023 
 (-1.21) (-0.31) (-0.05) (-0.76) (1.48) (0.85) (0.56) (-0.36) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.345*** 0.256** 0.074 0.038 -0.302*** -0.143 -0.137* -0.120 
 (3.15) (2.31) (1.32) (0.74) (-2.90) (-0.89) (-1.79) (-1.62) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 13,910 13,910 13,910 13,910 13,910 13,910 13,910 13,910 
Adj. R-squared 0.614 0.614 0.614 0.614 0.620 0.620 0.620 0.620 
 Less Effective 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -0.000 -0.009 -0.005 0.020 0.015 -0.060 -0.081 -0.093 
 (-0.00) (-0.10) (-0.05) (0.22) (0.14) (-0.51) (-0.67) (-0.75) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.010 -0.020 0.002 -0.008 -0.025 0.003 0.025 0.008 
 (-0.24) (-0.47) (0.05) (-0.12) (-0.65) (0.06) (0.50) (0.12) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.003 0.088 0.069** 0.037 0.054 -0.057 -0.105** -0.086* 
 (0.02) (0.71) (1.99) (1.11) (0.51) (-0.49) (-2.22) (-1.73) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.007 -0.008 -0.058 -0.090 0.010 -0.034 -0.083* -0.114** 
 (0.24) (-0.25) (-1.32) (-1.61) (0.37) (-1.00) (-1.83) (-2.00) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.012 -0.043 -0.018 -0.029 -0.019 0.100 0.132** 0.120** 
 (-0.10) (-0.45) (-0.60) (-1.10) (-0.27) (1.18) (2.51) (2.23) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 16,081 16,081 16,081 16,081 16,081 16,081 16,081 16,081 
Adj. R-squared 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.723 
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Panel D. High vs. Low GDP growth 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ForesaleHIGH ForesaleLOW 
  High GDP Growth 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -0.545*** -0.578*** -0.576*** -0.574*** 0.353*** 0.353*** 0.376*** 0.386*** 
 (-4.36) (-4.65) (-4.66) (-4.58) (3.07) (2.84) (3.18) (3.23) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.018 -0.044 -0.113* -0.082 -0.139*** -0.135** -0.116* -0.085 
 (0.24) (-0.70) (-1.82) (-1.14) (-2.59) (-2.17) (-1.77) (-1.14) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.400** -0.186 0.123** 0.152*** 0.555** 0.382 0.133* 0.136* 
 (-2.02) (-1.14) (2.22) (2.68) (2.26) (1.60) (1.84) (1.86) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.046 -0.021 -0.024 -0.046 0.057 0.054 0.016 -0.013 
 (-1.16) (-0.43) (-0.40) (-0.65) (1.48) (1.00) (0.27) (-0.18) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.351*** 0.242** 0.102** 0.069 -0.271*** -0.203 -0.133* -0.131* 
 (3.38) (2.49) (2.04) (1.51) (-2.68) (-1.29) (-1.79) (-1.77) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,777 14,777 14,777 14,777 14,777 14,777 14,777 14,777 
Adj. R-squared 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 
 Low GDP Growth 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -0.111 -0.126 -0.104 -0.089 0.028 -0.034 -0.010 -0.028 
 (-1.58) (-1.63) (-1.35) (-1.17) (0.35) (-0.40) (-0.12) (-0.33) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.030 -0.004 0.023 0.003 -0.027 0.018 0.047 0.019 
 (0.73) (-0.10) (0.54) (0.05) (-0.68) (0.42) (1.04) (0.30) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.162 -0.022 0.063* 0.025 0.094 -0.112 -0.073 -0.063 
 (-1.11) (-0.21) (1.92) (0.79) (0.88) (-0.98) (-1.40) (-1.17) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.029 -0.005 -0.036 -0.061 0.042 -0.009 -0.044 -0.070 
 (-1.03) (-0.16) (-0.90) (-1.17) (1.39) (-0.24) (-1.04) (-1.30) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.196* 0.072 0.010 0.002 -0.107 0.083 0.051 0.055 
 (1.79) (0.84) (0.39) (0.07) (-1.46) (0.96) (0.89) (0.96) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 15,214 15,214 15,214 15,214 15,214 15,214 15,214 15,214 
Adj. R-squared 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.749 
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Table 6 
Empirical Identification 
 
This table presents OLS results, where the dependent variable is TobinQ_adj, industry-adjusted Tobin’s 
Q. Treated is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is with high foreign sales in countries 
affected by the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and zero for a single-nation 
firm without European sales. High foreign sales are defined as if firms’ average European foreign sales 
are greater than the median value of the entire European foreign sales during 2002–2004. Post is a 
dummy variable that takes value of one if years fall in 2005–2007 and zero if years fall in 2002–2004. 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] (or Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] ) is the cumulative number of green (nongreen) patents from 
year t-N (N=1, 3, 5, and 7) to year t and log-transformed it after adding one (Furman, Porter, and 
Stern, 2002). All regressions include firm and year fixed effects, but coefficients are omitted. The 
numbers shown in parentheses are t-statistics clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q_adj 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] x Treated x Post 0.095 0.054 0.058** 0.053** 
 (0.71) (1.26) (2.05) (2.01) 
Post x Treated 0.189*** 0.179*** 0.169*** 0.175*** 
 (2.99) (2.82) (2.65) (2.75) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t]  x Post -0.125 -0.057 -0.052* -0.047* 
 (-0.95) (-1.36) (-1.76) (-1.70) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t]  x Treated -0.024 0.047 -0.063 -0.074 
 (-0.14) (0.34) (-0.30) (-0.31) 
Treated -0.507* -0.511* -0.482* -0.478* 
 (-1.87) (-1.88) (-1.83) (-1.86) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.037 -0.178 -0.104 -0.029 
 (-0.22) (-1.35) (-0.53) (-0.14) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.024 0.084 0.037 -0.151 
 (0.50) (1.14) (0.39) (-1.39) 
HHIPROD 0.035 0.044 0.040 0.025 
 (0.27) (0.34) (0.31) (0.19) 
Ln(MkCap) 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) 
ROA -0.065 -0.049 -0.058 -0.064 
 (-0.18) (-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.18) 
Cash 1.581*** 1.579*** 1.574*** 1.593*** 
 (5.97) (5.95) (5.93) (6.04) 
Leverage 0.063 0.066 0.076 0.079 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.33) (0.35) 
Tangibility 0.388 0.388 0.391 0.402 
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 (1.11) (1.11) (1.12) (1.15) 
R&D 1.383** 1.409** 1.389** 1.413** 
 (1.99) (2.04) (2.01) (2.04) 
HHIIND 0.638 0.649 0.603 0.570 
 (1.35) (1.38) (1.29) (1.23) 
Ln(GDPpa) 0.552 0.092 -0.758 -0.708 
 (0.19) (0.03) (-0.25) (-0.24) 
Trade -0.023 -0.020 -0.022 -0.021 
 (-0.61) (-0.53) (-0.59) (-0.58) 
RuleLaw -0.132 -0.097 -0.096 -0.101 
 (-0.28) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.21) 
EPS -0.033 -0.035 -0.040 -0.043 
 (-0.41) (-0.42) (-0.49) (-0.53) 
Ppindex -0.077 -0.145 -0.135 -0.008 
 (-0.15) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.02) 
Educ 2.052 2.034 2.053 1.931 
 (0.95) (0.94) (0.96) (0.91) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering SD YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,382 8,382 8,382 8,382 
Adj. R-squared 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.651 
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Table 7 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 
This table presents the results of robustness tests with alternative proxy variable of the firm value. 
Tobin’s Q is computed as sum of market value of equity, the liquidating value of preferred stock, and 
the value of debts divided by the book value of assets ExcessVal is computed as market value of equity 
minus book value of equity divided by sales. Panel A reports OLS results that examine the relation 
between MNC’s foreign sale and firm value. Panel B reports OLS results that examine the effect of 
green innovation interacted with foreign sales on firm value. All regressions included the same set of 
control variables used in Table 3, firm and year fixed effects, but coefficients are omitted to report. 
The number shown in parentheses are t-values clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Foreign Sales and Firm Value 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Tobin's Q ExcessVal 
Foresale -0.145   -2.395**   
 (-1.59)   (-2.03)   
ForesaleHIGH  -0.163**   -2.838***  
  (-2.56)   (-4.20)  
ForesaleLOW   0.039   0.950 
   (0.60)   (1.00) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,912 29,912 29,912 
Adj. R-squared 0.691 0.692 0.691 0.631 0.631 0.631 
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Panel B. Foreign Sales, Green Innovation, and Firm Value  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  ForesaleHIGH ForesaleLOW 
 Dependent variable: Tobin's Q 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -0.219*** -0.275*** -0.289*** -0.285*** 0.089 0.058 0.080 0.072 
 (-3.29) (-3.93) (-4.00) (-3.90) (1.30) (0.76) (1.07) (0.95) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.029 -0.000 -0.039 -0.052 -0.072* -0.039 -0.031 -0.044 
 (0.72) (-0.00) (-1.04) (-1.12) (-1.94) (-0.90) (-0.79) (-0.93) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.278** -0.130 0.087*** 0.107*** 0.229** 0.094 0.024 0.042 
 (-2.13) (-1.26) (2.66) (3.52) (2.01) (0.69) (0.63) (1.04) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.015 -0.019 -0.033 -0.059 0.079*** 0.026 -0.010 -0.044 
 (-0.61) (-0.66) (-0.95) (-1.37) (2.98) (0.82) (-0.30) (-1.01) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.257*** 0.194*** 0.086*** 0.059** -0.198*** -0.065 -0.051 -0.048 
 (3.06) (2.75) (3.12) (2.52) (-3.09) (-0.66) (-1.12) (-1.09) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 
Adj. R-squared 0.691 0.692 0.692 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.691 
 Dependent variable: ExcessVal 
 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 N=1 N=3 N=5 N=7 
Foresale -2.947*** -2.855*** -3.127*** -3.225*** 0.829 0.921 0.705 0.624 
 (-4.13) (-3.81) (-4.00) (-4.06) (0.81) (0.83) (0.60) (0.53) 
Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.173 -0.900* -0.872** -0.872* 0.188 -0.771* -0.834* -0.848 
 (0.43) (-1.87) (-2.00) (-1.71) (0.55) (-1.80) (-1.82) (-1.60) 
Foresale x Ln(GpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.530 1.570 0.636** 0.527** -0.553 0.969 0.246 0.278 
 (-0.50) (1.62) (2.28) (2.08) (-0.71) (1.43) (0.78) (0.69) 
Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] -0.206 0.606* 0.448 -0.030 -0.198 0.574* 0.462 -0.022 
 (-0.84) (1.68) (1.10) (-0.08) (-0.90) (1.77) (1.13) (-0.06) 
Foresale x Ln(NGpatStock)[t-N,t] 0.457 -0.685 0.092 0.133 0.481 -0.423 0.042 0.060 
 (0.75) (-1.09) (0.39) (0.62) (0.88) (-0.93) (0.12) (0.15) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering SD YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,912 29,912 29,912 29,912 29,912 29,912 29,912 29,912 
Adj. R-squared 0.631 0.631 0.632 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.631 
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Appendix A 
Internationalization and Firm Performance 
 
This table presents OLS results where the dependent variable is TobinQ_adj, industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. 
ForesaleHIGH (or ForesaleLOW) is the percentage of foreign sales (in total sales) that incur sales in countries whose 
environmental regulations are more stringent (or less stringent) than those of corporate home country. All 
regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The number shown in parentheses are t-statistics clustered at 
the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Dependent variable: TobinQ_adj 
Foresale -0.140**   -0.084   
 (-2.40)   (-0.96)   
ForesaleHIGH  -0.328***   -0.207***  
  (-4.08)   (-3.12)  
ForesaleLOW   -0.010   0.132** 
   (-0.16)   (2.12) 
HHIPROD 0.358*** 0.355*** 0.359*** 0.161** 0.163** 0.162** 
 (7.19) (7.13) (7.20) (2.18) (2.21) (2.19) 
Ln(MkCap) 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.047** 0.048** 0.048** 
 (14.91) (15.24) (14.64) (2.50) (2.56) (2.54) 
ROA -0.654*** -0.655*** -0.661*** -0.112 -0.117 -0.117 
 (-3.47) (-3.48) (-3.51) (-0.68) (-0.71) (-0.71) 
Cash 1.631*** 1.625*** 1.632*** 1.056*** 1.058*** 1.059*** 
 (13.89) (13.83) (13.88) (6.95) (6.96) (6.97) 
Leverage 0.447*** 0.449*** 0.446*** 0.315** 0.316** 0.317** 
 (4.25) (4.27) (4.24) (2.45) (2.46) (2.46) 
Tangibility -0.225** -0.230** -0.214** -0.088 -0.084 -0.082 
 (-2.48) (-2.54) (-2.35) (-0.53) (-0.51) (-0.49) 
R&D 2.639*** 2.640*** 2.620*** 2.979*** 2.983*** 2.977*** 
 (7.39) (7.40) (7.34) (6.96) (6.97) (6.95) 
HHIIND -0.047 -0.045 -0.052 0.014 0.029 0.020 
 (-0.52) (-0.50) (-0.58) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) 
Ln(GDPpa) -1.185 -1.173 -1.202 -0.154 -0.187 -0.147 
 (-1.46) (-1.45) (-1.49) (-0.25) (-0.30) (-0.24) 
Trade -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 0.002 0.004 0.003 
 (-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.98) (0.34) (0.49) (0.41) 
RuleLaw 0.763*** 0.738*** 0.756*** 0.698*** 0.659*** 0.677*** 
 (3.01) (2.91) (2.97) (3.79) (3.58) (3.67) 
EPS 0.063** 0.031 0.049 0.057** 0.046* 0.050** 
 (2.06) (1.05) (1.54) (2.23) (1.78) (1.96) 
Ppindex 0.260 0.225 0.222 -0.006 -0.009 -0.002 
 (0.53) (0.47) (0.46) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.00) 
Educ 0.324 0.401 0.243 0.163 0.183 0.164 
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(0.74) (0.91) (0.55) (0.39) (0.44) (0.39) 
Firm FE NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Country FE YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustering YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 29,991 
Adj. R-squared 0.207 0.208 0.206 0.644 0.644 0.644 
 
In this section, we investigate the link between internationalization and firm value from the 
perspective of the environmental standards that MNCs face in the course of foreign business. We thus 
construct the following baseline model: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄_𝑎𝑑𝑗 = α + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒(%) + 𝛽2𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖                              (2) 
The dependent variable, TobinQ_adj, measures the firm’s long-term performance at year t. Foresale is 
the key variable of interest, representing the percentage of foreign sales at year t. To examine how 
foreign sales in countries with high and low levels of environmental stringency will affect firm value, 
we also construct and use ForesaleHIGH and ForesaleLOW, respectively. X represents a vector of the firm 
and country control variables specified in Section 2.1. We use either an industry, country, and year 
fixed effects model or a firm and year fixed effects model, but the latter is used to report our results 
throughout the paper. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level to correct for within-firm 
correlation. 
The Appendix A reports the detailed results of the baseline regressions. In column (1)-(3), we 
report OLS results with industry, country, and year effects. In column (1), we find that the coefficient 
of Foresale is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result is consistent with the 
findings in Graham et al (2002), Campa and Kedia (2002), and Denis et al (2002), indicating a firm’s 
geographical diversification is negatively associated with firm value. Economically speaking, an 
increase of one percent of a firm’s foreign sale decreases Tobin’s q by 0.14. In the next two columns, 
we split a firm’s foreign sale into ForesaleHIGH and ForesaleLOW based on the strength of environmental 
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policies in countries where foreign sales take place relative to that of those in the firm’s home country. 
We find that the negative relation with performance only appears in the case of foreign sales in 
countries whose environmental standards are stronger than those in the firm’s home country, but not 
in the case of foreign sales in countries whose environmental standards are weaker than those in the 
firm’s home country. We interpret this result as driven by the extra compliance costs MNCs face when 
they want to penetrate into foreign markets with stricter environmental standards, resulting in a 
reduction in firm value. In columns (4)-(6), we repeat the analyses in columns (1)-(3) using the firm 
and year fixed effects model. In column (4), we find that the coefficient of Foresale is negative but 
insignificant. In column (5), the coefficient of ForesaleHIGH is negative and significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that higher sales from countries with more stringent environmental protection are 
associated with lower firm values. However, in column (6), we show that the coefficient of ForesaleLOW 
is positive and significant at the 5% level suggesting that the relation between geographic 
diversification and firm value is contingent on the level of environmental stringency.  
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